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THE TRANSFORMATION OF 
INTERNATIONAL COMITY 
JOEL R. PAUL* 
I 
INTRODUCTION 
Private international law reflects and shapes the contours of public and 
private law in ways that demarcate the boundaries of state sovereignty and 
allocate power among public and private actors. When courts decide on the 
reach of domestic and foreign law, or on the availability and appropriateness of 
the forum, they are balancing the forum’s public policy against the rights of 
private parties. In doing so, they are also circumscribing both the relationship 
between the court and the political branches and between the forum state and 
the world. Private international law functions much like a constitution to 
empower and delimit authority, and, much like a constitution, the evolution of 
private international law is a story about the shifting historical context in which 
courts, the sovereign, and private actors play out their relations in market and 
personal transactions. 
In the United States the foundation of private international law is the 
doctrine of international comity. Roughly speaking, courts, according to this 
doctrine, should apply foreign law or limit domestic jurisdiction out of respect 
for foreign sovereignty.1 International comity requires courts to balance 
competing public and private interests in a manner that takes into account any 
conflict between the public policies of the domestic and foreign sovereigns. 
Scholars and courts have characterized international comity inconsistently 
as a choice-of-law principle,2 a synonym for private international law,3 a rule of 
public international law,4 a moral obligation,5 expediency,6 courtesy,7 
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 1. MARK JANIS, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 327 (2003). 
 2. See, e.g., IAN F.G. BAXTER, ESSAYS ON PRIVATE LAW 22 (1966). 
 3. See, e.g., JOSEPH H. BEALE, A TREATISE ON THE CONFLICTS OF LAW, vol. 1 § 6.1 (1935); 
 L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 34 n.1 (H. Lauterpacht ed., 8th ed. 1955). 
 4. See, e.g., Letter from Elihu Root, Secretary of State, to Victor H. Metcalf, Secretary of 
Commerce and Labor (Mar. 16, 1906), in 288 DOMESTIC LETTERS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE 
(describing comity as a rule of public international law), cited in 4 GREEN H. HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 460 (1942). But see Harold Maier, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction at a Crossroads: 
An Intersection Between Public and Private International Law, 76 AM. J. INT’L. L. 280, 281 (1982) (“The 
doctrine of comity is not a rule of public international law, but the term characterizes many of the same 
functional elements that define a system of international legal order.”). 
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reciprocity,8 utility,9 or diplomacy.10 Authorities disagree as to whether comity is 
a rule of natural law, custom, treaty, or domestic law. 11 Indeed, there is not even 
agreement that comity is a rule of law at all.12 Although other jurisdictions 
sometimes employ the term comity as a synonym for diplomatic immunity,13 in 
the United States comity has served as a principle of deference to foreign law 
and foreign courts.14 
For all these reasons, international comity would seem to be too vague, 
incoherent, illusory, and ephemeral to serve as a foundation for U.S. private 
international law. Yet, it is precisely these qualities that have allowed the 
doctrine of international comity to mutate over time in ways that respond to 
different geopolitical circumstances. Specifically, international comity has 
shifted in three distinct respects. First, the meaning of comity has shifted over 
time. Originally, international comity was a discretionary doctrine that 
empowered courts to decide when to defer to foreign law out of respect for 
foreign sovereigns.15 Comity has become a rule that obligates courts to apply 
foreign law in certain circumstances.16 Second, the object of comity has changed. 
Whereas once courts justified applying foreign law out of deference to foreign 
sovereigns, courts later justified their decisions out of deference to the 
autonomy of private parties or to the political branches.17 Most recently, courts 
have justified limits on domestic law out of deference to the global market. 
Third, the function of comity has changed. Comity is no longer merely a 
doctrine for deciding when to apply foreign law; it has become a justification for 
deference in a wide range of cases concerning prescriptive, adjudicatory, and 
enforcement jurisdiction. 
This article briefly traces these shifts in the meaning, function, and object of 
international comity. These developments are closely tied to historical contexts: 
the conflict over slavery in the early nineteenth century, the development of a 
 
 5. See, e.g., IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 31 (3d ed. 1979); 
JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS § 33 (1834). 
 6. See, e.g., Somportex, Ltd. v. Philadelphia Chewing Gum Corp., 453 F.2d 435, 440 (3d Cir. 1971). 
 7. See, e.g., FRANCIS WHARTON, A TREATISE ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 5 (2d ed. 1881). 
 8. See, e.g., Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163–64 (1895); Hans Smit, International Res Judicata 
and Collateral Estoppel, 9 UCLA L. REV. 44, 53 (1962). 
 9. See, e.g., BEALE, supra note 3, § 71; HENRY WHEATON, ELEMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 
§ 79 (Richard Henry Dana, Jr. ed., 8th ed. 1866) (“There is no obligation, recognized by legislators, 
public authorities, and publicists, to regard foreign laws; but their application is admitted, only from 
considerations of utility and the mutual convenience of States . . . .”). 
 10. See, e.g., Harold Maier, Interest Balancing and Extraterritorial Jurisdiction, 31 AM. J. COMP. L. 
579, 589 (1983). 
 11. See Joel R. Paul, Comity in International Law, 32 HARV. INT’L L.J. 1, 4 (1991). 
 12. Id. 
 13. E.g., Judgment of Jan. 27, 1969, Cass. Civ. 1re, Arrêt no. 75 (dismissing a civil suit against a 
foreign consulate out of comity). 
 14. Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 164 (1895). 
 15. Paul, supra note 11, at 17. 
 16. Id. at 78. 
 17. Id. at 63–69. 
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national economy in the latter half of the nineteenth century, the Cold War in 
the mid-twentieth century, and the present era of globalization. 
For these purposes, the term “comity” is used here in two senses. First, it 
refers to the classical doctrine of comity as it evolved through the nineteenth 
century. This classical idea of comity was quite specific and applied narrowly to 
conflict-of-laws cases. In all these cases, courts applied foreign law out of 
deference to foreign sovereigns. Since the turn of the twentieth century, comity 
has come to inform a broader class of cases in which courts have applied foreign 
law or refrained from the exercise of domestic prescriptive, adjudicatory, or 
enforcement jurisdiction. In this regard, comity functions both as a conflicts rule 
and as a justification for deferring to the foreign law. This broader concept of 
comity as a rule and a justification for deference encompasses a wider 
constellation of cases and related doctrines—like the foreign-act-of-state 
doctrine—which, though analytically distinct from the classical doctrine, 
nonetheless shares certain methods, values, and justificatory rhetoric. The 
article’s conclusions apply with equal force to both the original form of the 
comity doctrine and the broader idea of comity both as a doctrine and a 
justification for deference to foreign law. 
II 
PRE-TWENTIETH CENTURY:  
COMITY AS DEFERENCE TO FOREIGN SOVEREIGNS 
A. Middle Ages to Renaissance: The Move From Statutism to Comity 
The origins of the comity doctrine are obscure, but comity must be 
understood as a reaction against the preexisting system of private international 
law known as statutism. European jurists had been wrestling with the question 
of when and how to apply foreign law since at least the thirteenth century.18 The 
need for a system to resolve conflicts of law arose as commerce between 
different city-states slowly increased. Medieval Italian jurists developed the 
statutist doctrine as a theory for determining the governing law based on 
statutory interpretation.19 According to the statutists, the legal status of every 
person or thing was fixed in a certain place at a certain time and could not be 
altered: a person’s martial status would be determined by the place where the 
marriage was performed; property rights would be determined by the place 
where the property was physically located.20 Statutism had an appealing 
uniformity and simplicity because everything could be readily and permanently 
categorized based upon place. Timing, intent, circumstance, public policy, or the 
 
 18. Walter Ulmann, LAW AND JURISDICTION IN THE MIDDLE AGES 397–410 (1988). 
 19. Hessel E. Yntema, The Historic Bases of Private International Law, 2 AM J. COMP. L. 297, 303–
04 (1953). 
 20. See Kurt Lipstein, PRINCIPLES OF THE CONFLICT OF LAWS, NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL 
7–12 (1981). 
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interests of the parties were subordinated to physical placement. In a 
premodern, relatively static world in which people lived their whole lives in one 
town and contact outside the local community was the exception rather than the 
norm, physical placement was an attractive solution to the question of when to 
apply foreign law. Obviously, as the opportunities for contact and business 
outside of a locality increased, so would the complexity of the questions 
confronted by the statutists. Accelerating commerce and movement inevitably 
would wear down the hard lines of statutism. As the doctrine grew more 
complex, it began drawing distinctions that seemed increasingly arbitrary.21 
As nation-states emerged, local law trumped the absolute authority of the 
Church and of Roman law and undermined claims of universality to any legal 
system.22 Statutism broke down under the pressure of competing national 
systems. Moreover, as commerce grew, so too did the frequency of contacts 
between merchants of different nationalities. Conflicts of law became more 
common. As people and goods became more mobile, a system of rules based on 
the static connection to a specific place seemed inflexible and unworkable. 
The northern Renaissance of the 1600s posed a particular challenge to the 
antiquated system of the statutists. The struggle for Dutch independence from 
the brutality of Spanish rule represented the triumph of modern commerce, 
religious tolerance, and nationalism over parochialism and prejudice. After 
thirty years of war the Dutch Republic emerged as the first modern European 
nation-state. The Treaty of Westphalia in 1648 became the first constitutive 
document of modern international law, embodying the principles of state 
sovereignty, equality, and respect for religious minorities.23 
Dutch independence raised new questions about the applicability of foreign 
law in Dutch courts. The Dutch wanted a theory that would both unify the 
Dutch provinces and create a post hoc rationalization for the application of 
Spanish law in Dutch courts during the period before independence. A group of 
Dutch jurists of the 1600s—John and Paul Voet, Christian Rodenburg, and 
particularly, Ulrich Huber—tried to find a more pragmatic, fluid approach to 
resolving conflicts of law that would reinforce the idea of sovereign 
independence. Huber first used the phrase comitas gentium, literally the 
“civility of nations,” to describe the justification for applying foreign law.24 
Huber wrote that sovereigns “so act by way of comity that rights acquired 
within the limits of a government retain their force everywhere so far as they do 
not cause prejudice to the powers or rights of such government or of their 
subjects.”25 Although Huber believed that comity was a principle of 
 
 21. See Friedrich Juenger, General Course on Private International Law, 193 RECUEIL DES COURS 
119 (1986). 
 22. As Alex Mills has pointed out, the growth of science and reason would eventually undermine 
any claim to universal natural laws, including statutism. Alex Mills, The Private History of International 
Law, 55 INT’L L. Q. 1, 15 (2006). 
 23. Leo Gross, The Peace of Westphalia, 1648–1948, 42 AM. J. INT’L. L. 20, 28–33 (1948). 
 24. Ernest G. Lorenzen, Huber’s De Conflictu Legum, 13 ILL. L. REV. 375, 376 (1919). 
 25. Id. 
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international law, he believed the decision to apply foreign law itself was left up 
to the state as an act of free will.26 Huber viewed all law as inherently territorial, 
and, therefore, the forum court was free to decide whether allowing foreign law 
to operate in its territory was consistent with the power and rights of the forum 
state and its citizens. At the core of this idea of comity was the respect of one 
sovereign for another. In the Dutch edition of his treatise, Huber employed a 
vivid metaphor to explain comity: “The high authorities of each country offer 
each other a hand.”27 One can envision this scene as it might have been depicted 
by the Dutch genre painters of the 1600s: a familiar commercial setting with two 
merchants concluding a transaction with a handshake. It is a masculine image 
that connotes mutual respect and authority between equals. 
B. Eighteenth to Nineteenth Century: Comity as Respect for the Forum’s 
Public Policy 
Comity developed in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries as a 
permissive doctrine that empowered courts to decide when to apply foreign law 
and to refrain from applying foreign law that conflicted with the forum’s public 
policy. Huber had little influence over the development of conflicts principles 
on the continent, but Lord Mansfield, the father of the law merchant, 
introduced comity into English law almost a century later. Scottish barristers, 
like Mansfield, were exposed to the writings of Dutch jurists with whom they 
shared a common religious and intellectual tradition that distinguished them 
from the parochialism of Anglican barristers. In The Case of James Sommersett, 
Sommersett, who was born a slave in the United States, had sailed to London 
with his master Stewart.28 Since Britain had outlawed slavery, Sommersett, after 
spending some time in London, argued that he was no longer a slave. Stewart 
insisted that since Sommersett was born a slave under the lex loci, he remained 
a slave. Sommersett’s attorney insisted that according to Huber the lex loci 
should not be applied by the forum where it conflicted with the forum’s public 
policy.29 Mansfield held that a British court could not be required to recognize 
the property rights of a U.S. slaveholder in his slave.30 Mansfield opined that 
slavery “is incapable of being introduced on any reasons, moral or political.”31 
Slavery was “so odious, that nothing can be suffered to support it, but positive 
law.”32 Mansfield viewed comity as discretionary; courts should apply foreign 
 
 26. See, e.g., Mills, supra note 22, at 26. But cf. ALAN WATSON, JOSEPH STORY AND THE COMITY 
OF ERRORS 8–9 (1992). Watson disagrees with the conventional interpretation of Huber. He insists that 
Huber “does not allow for free discretion applying foreign law.” Id. at 8. 
 27. In Dutch, “de Hooge machten van yder Landt bieden elckander de handt.” ULRICH HUBER, 
HEEDENSDAEGSE RECHTSGELEERTHEYT 13 (1699). 
 28. The Case of James Sommersett, 20 How. St. Tr. 1, 3–4 (K.B. 1772). 
 29. Id. at 60. 
 30. Id. at 82. 
 31. Id. at 82. 
 32. See ROBERT COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED 87 (1975). 
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law except to the extent that it conflicted with principles of natural justice or 
public policy, such as the prohibition against the slave trade. 
Mansfield’s approach was not necessarily followed by other British courts. 
The common law’s ideas about conflict of laws were far from settled. As foreign 
commerce increased, so did the need for addressing the question of which law 
governed. In the United States, conflict of laws also arose from interstate 
commerce. The expansion of the U.S. territory after the Louisiana Purchase 
and the resulting tensions between free and slave states spurred efforts to 
articulate a coherent doctrine of conflict of laws. 
The Louisiana attorney Samuel Livermore in 1828 authored the first 
American treatise on conflicts, in which he sought to revive the doctrine of the 
statutists and explicitly rejected Mansfield’s ideas of comity. Livermore 
described comity “as grating to the ear when it proceeds from a court of 
justice.”33 According to Livermore, international law did not allow courts any 
discretion to decide whether to apply foreign law.34 Instead, courts were bound 
by international law to apply the same law that a foreign court would apply. 
Livermore’s argument provoked a contrary argument from Supreme Court 
Justice Joseph Story.35 Justice Story’s thesis became the foundation for 
American conflicts principles. 
As a circuit judge, Story had written a passionate opinion striking down the 
property claims of foreign slave traders on the basis that the slave trade violated 
the law of nations.36 Story, a Harvard Law professor, thought that Livermore 
had it exactly wrong. Story’s concern was that free and slave states needed some 
freedom to decide when and how to enforce the slave laws. He believed that a 
comprehensive system for resolving conflicts of law that was flexible and 
indulged the public policies of the forum state would relieve tensions between 
free and slave states and lead to greater accommodation.37 In his Commentaries 
on the Conflict of Laws, Story borrowed the doctrine of international comity 
directly from Huber and Mansfield.38 By allowing courts the freedom not to 
apply foreign law, Story hoped to localize the effect of slavery. Only if a state 
wished to accommodate the law of another state would its courts apply foreign 
law. Comity was consensual, not obligatory. Over time, a pattern of states 
voluntarily applying each other’s laws would encourage reciprocity and greater 
trust. Story hoped his system of conflicts rules would reduce the risk of a civil 
war between the states.39 
 
 33. SAMUEL LIVERMORE, DISSERTATION ON THE QUESTIONS WHICH ARISE FROM THE 
CONTRARIETY OF THE POSITIVE LAWS OF DIFFERENT STATES AND NATIONS 26 (1928). 
 34. Id. at 26. 
 35. Paul, supra note 11, at 20–21. 
 36. United States v. La Jeune Eugenie, 26 F. Cas. 832, 851 (C.C.D. Mass. 1822). 
 37. See PAUL FINKELMAN, AN IMPERFECT UNION: SLAVERY, FEDERALISM AND COMITY (1981); 
R. KENT NEWMYER, SUPREME COURT JUSTICE JOSEPH STORY 372 (1985). 
 38. STORY, supra note 5, § 29. 
 39. See FINKELMAN, supra note 37. 
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Justice Story characterized comity as the foundation of conflicts principles. 
He described conflicts of law for the first time as “private international law,” 
which he argued was merely a subcategory of international law.40 In other 
words, there was a unity of public and private international law, and domestic 
conflicts principles were derived from international law, rather than domestic 
law. By placing private international law within the framework of international 
law, Story was expressing the unity of public and private law that prevailed up 
through the middle of the nineteenth century. Story created a universal vision 
of conflicts that rivaled the statutists. Yet, he also asserted the primacy of the 
sovereign will of the forum state. It was an ingenious move that anticipated the 
rise of legal positivism in the latter half of the nineteenth century. 
Story, like Mansfield and Huber, envisioned the doctrine of international 
comity as a license for courts to deny foreign law when it conflicted with the 
forum’s own public policy. All three jurists were concerned with deeply 
polarizing public issues—nationalism, religious factionalism, and slavery. For 
each, comity empowered courts to decide whether to defer to foreign law out of 
respect for a foreign sovereign or whether domestic public policy should 
triumph over mere courtesy. For each, the court was the agent of the 
sovereign’s own public law. 
C. Industrialization and the Separation of Public and Private Law 
Unfortunately, Story’s elegantly framed doctrinal solution to the problem of 
slavery did not spare the United States the trauma of the Civil War, and the 
unity of public and private international law that he had envisioned barely 
survived the end of the nineteenth century.41 To appreciate why private 
international law separated from public international law, it is necessary to 
consider the effect of industrialization on the relationship of public and private 
law generally in the nineteenth century. As political, economic, and 
technological forces transformed a local agrarian economy into an industrial 
national economy, these same forces created a fissure between public and 
private law.42 
The growth of large enterprises and the concentration of capital, which were 
essential to the industrialization project, were facilitated by laissez-faire 
economics and the belief that the private market was outside the reach of public 
regulation. Of course, in reality, federal support was essential for the 
development of new infrastructure, and both the federal and state governments 
shaped regulations to ease the growing pains of the new industries.43 The market 
was “natural,” while the state was unnatural; as long as the market remained 
 
 40. STORY, supra note 5, § 9. 
 41. See Joel R. Paul, The Isolation of Private International Law, 7 WIS. INT’L L.J. 149, 163 (1988). 
 42. Arguably, Justice Story himself contributed to the emergence of the public–private distinction 
decades earlier with his opinion in Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 
666, 668–84 (1819) (Story, J., concurring). 
 43. See MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 130–39 (1992). 
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“free” from state control, it would bring prosperity and progress.44 The role of 
courts was to police the state’s neutrality and maintain the limits on federal 
power over the economy. 
Shaped by these assumptions at the turn of the century, U.S. courts erected 
a wall of separation between public and private law that would have seemed 
strange to a jurist a century earlier.45 Judges read into the federal constitution 
natural-law rights to property and contract, declaring that the fourteenth 
amendment’s due-process clause safeguarded the liberty of the marketplace.46 
By insulating property and contract rights from the reach of the state, the courts 
drew a boundary between domestic U.S. public and private law.47 
These developments in domestic U.S. law indirectly undermined the unity of 
public and private international law as well. Early in the twentieth century, 
public international lawyers abandoned private international law at the 
doorstep of municipal law. Private international law became a subject of 
domestic (mostly state) private law. Even the name “private international law” 
became outmoded in the United States, and most U.S. legal scholars now 
referred to it as “conflict of laws.” By rechristening private international law 
“conflict of laws,” lawyers and judges reinforced the idea that private 
international law had no familial relationship to the grand principles of public 
international law. Conflicts rules were a subject of the private law of the forum 
state, and there was no pretense that the conflict rules in California or New 
York were somehow derived from universal principles under public 
international law. Yet, until the end of the nineteenth century, even after 
private international law had been transformed into purely domestic law, U.S. 
courts continued to regard the application of foreign law as a matter of 
international comity—a courtesy owed to another sovereign—rather than an 
 
 44. See Morton J. Horwitz, The History of the Public/Private Distinction, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1423, 
1424–26 (1982). 
 45. For a good discussion of why this distinction is untenable, see Duncan Kennedy, The Stages of 
the Decline of the Public/Private Distinction, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1349 (1982). 
 46. In the last quarter of the nineteenth century the Supreme Court confronted the emerging 
public–private distinction in The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873) (upholding a 
Louisiana statute creating a slaughterhouse monopoly within New Orleans). There the Court upheld 
state regulation of slaughterhouses against the argument that the state was interfering in Fourteenth 
Amendment rights of due process, equal protection, and privileges and immunities of citizenship. The 
Court noted that rights originate from the state, not natural law. Id. at 77. Citizens have whatever 
specific rights are contained in the Constitution plus whatever additional rights are conferred by the 
states. Id. at 77–80. The famous dissents by Justices Field and Bradley argued that the Constitution 
protects “natural rights” to property and livelihood. Id. at 95–98 (Field, J., dissenting); id. at 113–19 
(Bradley, J., dissenting). Field and Bradley’s broader view of fundamental rights contributed to a strong 
backlash, which eventually resulted in the Court’s infamous opinion in Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 
45 (1905), striking down a law that limited the hours bakers could work as a denial of the substantive 
due-process right to contract. 
 47. As Morton Horwitz concluded his study of American law in the eighteenth century, legal 
formalism depends upon elites having “a great interest in disguising and suppressing the inevitably 
political and redistributive functions of law.” HORWITZ, supra note 43, at 266. 
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obligation under domestic law. The shift from courtesy to obligation did not 
begin until the turn of the twentieth century.48 
D. Early Twentieth Century: Comity as More Than Mere Courtesy 
In the waning hours of the nineteenth century, the Supreme Court issued its 
classic statement on comity in Hilton v. Guyot.49 A French company sued a U.S. 
national in the United States to enforce a French court’s order to pay damages 
arising out of a contract performed in France. The enforcement of a foreign 
judgment was a matter of comity, Justice Gray wrote: 
“Comity,” in the legal sense, is neither a matter of absolute obligation, on the one 
hand, nor of mere courtesy and good will, upon the other. But it is the recognition 
which one nation allows within its territory to the legislative, executive or judicial acts 
of another nation, having due regard both to international duty and convenience, and 
to the rights of its own citizens or of other persons who are under the protection of its 
laws.50 
Accordingly, the Court reasoned that a foreign court’s judgment should be 
given effect only if the foreign court would have given effect to an equivalent 
judgment by a U.S. court.51 Since French courts would not have enforced a U.S. 
court’s order in a comparable situation, the Supreme Court decided that a U.S. 
court was under no obligation to enforce the French court’s award of damages.52 
This enigmatic description of comity contains two significant ambiguities. 
First, what does it mean to say that comity is neither “absolute obligation” nor 
“mere courtesy and goodwill”? The application of foreign law is inherently 
indeterminate; it is a matter for the court’s discretion, not quite binding, but 
perhaps a bit stickier than mere “goodwill.” Second, comity is offered here both 
as a rule for the enforcement of foreign judgments, and as an explanation for 
why foreign judgments should be enforced. In other words, comity is both a 
legal doctrine and also a justification for deferring to foreign judgments. The 
central premise in Hilton is that, whatever comity means, it is a concern that 
arises from the sovereign equality of states. Thus, as the twentieth century 
began, it was still clear that the doctrine of comity derived from the respect that 
one sovereign paid to another. 
Comity’s meaning became more ambiguous as the vested-rights theorists 
gained prominence in the early decades of the twentieth century. Scholars like 
Joseph H. Beale rejected comity as a basis for deciding the governing law.53 
They argued that courts did not literally apply foreign law.54 Rather, courts 
recognize “vested rights” that private parties obtained in foreign jurisdictions.55 
 
 48. Paul, supra note 11, at 26–27. 
 49. 159 U.S. 113 (1895). 
 50. Id. at 163–64. 
 51. Id. at 228–29. 
 52. Id.  
 53. BEALE, supra note 3, § 6.1. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. 
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As such, the obligation to do justice bound courts to protect vested rights. The 
first Restatement on the Conflict of Laws concluded that no comity doctrine 
“governs the action of a court with regard to the enforcement of a foreign 
right.”56 The vested-rights theory briefly offered an alternative to comity as the 
basis for conflict of laws, until it was exposed as a tautology in the 1930s. By 
then, legal scholars seemed to agree that deference to foreign sovereigns was 
more a matter of obligation than of mere courtesy.57 
By mid-century, U.S. legal scholars like Brainerd Currie had abandoned the 
formalism of the vested-rights theory in favor of interest analysis.58 In their view, 
courts should defer to foreign law based upon the balance of public and private 
interests. Vested-rights theory had affected the way these scholars thought 
about deference. According to these scholars, courts were not free to exercise 
their unbounded discretion in deciding whether to apply foreign law. Although 
courts were not necessarily obligated to apply foreign law if it conflicted with 
the public policy of the forum, there were principles of interest-balancing that 
constrained the courts. The meaning of comity was shifting from a doctrine of 
deference based upon courtesy to a doctrine of deference based upon 
obligation.59 
III 
THE POST-WAR ERA: COMITY AS DEFERENCE  
TO THE AUTONOMY OF PRIVATE PARTIES AND TO THE EXECUTIVE 
Two interconnected developments after World War II—the growth of 
international commerce and the pervasive threat posed by the Cold War—
transformed comity from a general principle of deference left to the discretion 
of courts into something more like an obligation to apply foreign law. First, the 
growth of foreign trade and multinationals led to a growing number of cases 
involving the enforcement of international contracts. U.S. courts were 
increasingly confronted with having to decide whether to enforce arbitration 
clauses, foreign choice-of-law and choice-of-forum clauses, and foreign judicial 
and arbitral decrees that were manifestly inconsistent with U.S. statutes.60 
Courts also faced the issue whether to extend U.S. regulatory jurisdiction to 
 
 56. RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6, cmt. a (1934). 
 57. See JOHN C. COLLIER, CONFLICT OF LAWS 351–54 (1987); Yntema, supra note 19, at 314–15. 
 58. See BRAINERD CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (1963). 
 59. See generally CURRIE, supra note 58. 
 60. For example, the U.S. Supreme Court enforced an arbitration clause in an international 
contract when the contract conflicted with U.S. antitrust laws. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler 
Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985). It was uncertain in that case whether a Japanese 
arbitrator would properly apply U.S. antitrust law when the contract provided that it was governed by 
Swiss law and when one of the defendants who allegedly engaged in anticompetitive behavior was not 
subject to the arbitration clause. As Justice Stevens noted in his dissent, “just as it is improper to 
subordinate the public interest in enforcement of antitrust policy to the private interest in resolving 
commercial disputes, so it is equally unwise to allow a vision of world unity to distort the importance of 
the selection of the proper forum for resolving its dispute.” Id. at 665 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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transactions that occurred overseas but violated public policies in the United 
States.61 
A. Comity as Deference to Private Autonomy 
These mid-twentieth-century opinions acknowledged not merely the 
traditional deference paid to foreign sovereigns, but more significantly, the 
need to defer to the autonomy of private parties. Where private parties had 
negotiated for foreign choice of law or forum, they should be held to their 
bargains.62 When parties operating outside of the United States had no 
reasonable expectation that they might be subject to U.S. law, it seemed unfair 
to impose U.S. law on them.63 The Restatement (Third) on Foreign Relations 
Law recharacterized the traditional doctrine of comity as a principle of 
“reasonableness,” and that principle applied not merely to prescriptive 
jurisdiction, but also to adjudicatory and enforcement jurisdiction.64 According 
to the Restatement, courts applying comity—or what the Restatement called a 
“principle of reasonableness”65—were explicitly required to consider the public 
interests of both the United States and the foreign government in determining 
when the exercise of jurisdiction is reasonable.66 Reasonableness also possessed 
overtones of due-process concerns, which seemed to bolster the argument that 
courts were obligated in some circumstances to apply foreign law. Chief Justice 
Warren Burger warned that we “cannot have trade and commerce in world 
markets and international waters exclusively on our terms, governed by our 
laws, and resolved in our courts.”67 Protecting private parties’ expectations was 
“an indispensable element in international trade, commerce, and contracting.”68 
By tying this expanded idea of comity as “reasonableness” to both foreign 
sovereigns and the autonomy of private parties, U.S. courts began to redefine 
the character of comity. The reporters of the Restatement preferred to use the 
term “reasonableness” to emphasize the idea of a “legal obligation” to apply 
foreign law, as contrasted with comity, which carried “too much of the idea of 
 
 61. For example, the U.S. Supreme Court decided not to apply U.S. securities laws prohibiting 
fraud in connection with the sale of securities when the sale of securities issued by a foreign company 
mostly took place overseas, even though it involved a U.S. purchaser. Scherck v. Alberto-Culver Co., 
417 U.S. 506 (1974). In another case, a U.S. circuit court decided not to extend U.S. antitrust laws to a 
foreign transaction in which one U.S. corporation manipulated a foreign government to destroy its U.S. 
competitor. Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am. Nat’l Trust & Sav. Ass’n, 549 F.2d. 597 (9th Cir. 
1976). 
 62. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628–31 (1985). 
 63. Scherck v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 517–19 (1974). 
 64. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 403, cmt. a 
(1986). 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. 
 67. The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 9 (1971). 
 68. Id. at 13–14. 
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discretion or even political judgment.”69 The meaning of comity had clearly 
shifted from a matter of judicial discretion to one of legal obligation. 
Furthermore, by focusing on the will of private parties, the courts reinforced 
the public–private distinction that arose in the nineteenth-century 
jurisprudence; respect for foreign law was becoming a metaphor for the idea 
that courts respected the wishes of private parties. For example, in one 
judgment upholding the enforcement of a foreign arbitration clause the 
Supreme Court opined, 
[W]e conclude that concerns of international comity, respect for the capacities of 
foreign and transnational tribunals, and sensitivity to the need of the international 
commercial system for predictability in the resolution of disputes require that we 
enforce the parties’ agreement, even assuming that a contrary result would be 
forthcoming in a domestic context.70 
In this way the Court tied comity to the imperative of protecting the 
expectations of private parties. Deference to foreign sovereigns had shifted 
towards deference to private-party autonomy. 
B. The Impact of the Cold War on Comity 
The other related development in the transformation of comity was the 
Cold War. The Cold War affected U.S. law and legal institutions generally and 
ultimately had profound consequences for the development of private 
international law in the United States. First, domestic anxieties over the danger 
posed by Communism bred a political environment that was hostile to 
government regulation of property, contract, and free enterprise. The 
possibilities for political action and public discourse were narrowed by the 
pervasive and imminent threat of Soviet communism, especially during the 
1950s.71 In this political environment any critique of private rights appeared 
suspect. The bold efforts of legal realists like Robert Hale72 in the first half of 
the century to use the law as an instrument for social policy were curtailed. 
Securing the expectations of private parties against excessive public regulation 
or occupation of private property was a hedge against the growth of 
authoritarian government. This judicial attitude was also reflected in judgments 
enforcing the choices that private parties made in their contracts. By enforcing 
foreign choice-of-law and arbitration clauses, U.S. courts evinced their 
commitment to protecting the autonomy of private parties. In this respect, the 
 
 69. Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Conflict, Balancing of Interests, and the Exercise of Jurisdiction to 
Prescribe: Reflections on the Insurance Antitrust Case, 89 AM. J. OF INT’L L. 42, 52 n.50 (1995). 
 70. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 629 (1985). 
 71. See EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., THE CRISIS OF DEMOCRATIC THEORY: SCIENTIFIC 
NATURALISM & THE PROBLEM OF VALUE 241–56 (1973) (arguing that moral relativism on the one 
hand and McCarthysm on the other reinforced the status quo and precluded public discussion of 
fundamental social reforms). 
 72. Robert Hale, Coercion and Distribution in a Supposedly Non-Coercive State, 38 POL. SCI. Q. 
470 (1923) (arguing that the status quo is actively constituted and enforced by coercive state power, and 
therefore, the distribution of property represents policy choices and is not merely the result of private 
market forces). 
PAUL_BOOK PROOF_FINAL.DOC 10/6/2008  10:17:15 AM 
Summer 2008] THE TRANSFORMATION OF INTERNATIONAL COMITY 31 
judicial response to the Cold War reinforced deference to private-party 
autonomy. 
Second, during the Cold War the United States took the leadership in 
promoting market democracy as a bulwark against Communism. Through the 
Marshall Plan and the Bretton Woods institutions (the International Monetary 
Fund, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, and the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) the United States sought to expand 
international trade by reducing government barriers to the free movement of 
goods, services, and capital. These measures contributed to the steady and 
significant increase in the total volume of world trade. To the extent that the 
global market was seen as a way of containing the spread of Communism, it is 
unsurprising that courts construed comity in ways that minimized the regulatory 
burdens on private parties and allowed transnational actors the freedom to opt 
out of domestic law in order to facilitate the growth of the global market. 
Third, relying on the judge-made concept of the executive as the “sole 
organ” of foreign relations,73 courts deferred to the perceived need for a 
powerful executive acting in secret to confront the Soviet threat.74 Courts 
treated the question of applying foreign law as frequently implicating foreign 
relations. Judges then justified the application of foreign law as a way of 
avoiding interference with the executive’s conduct of foreign relations.75 
One example of this approach was the Court’s decision in Banco Nacionale 
de Cuba v. Sabbatino, applying the foreign act-of-state doctrine to bar a claim 
arising out of President Castro’s expropriation of U.S. property in Cuba.76 The 
claimants argued that the expropriation was illegal under international law and 
that the U.S. court should apply international law, rather than Cuban law, to the 
claim.77 Banco de Cuba argued on behalf of the Cuban Government that the 
claim was precluded by the foreign act-of-state doctrine, even if the action were 
contrary to international law.78 The act-of-state defense operates like a super-
choice-of-law rule that requires U.S. courts in some circumstances to apply 
foreign law to a foreign act of state that occurs in the foreign territory. The 
Supreme Court held that the doctrine prohibited U.S. courts from questioning 
the validity of a foreign act of state even if it violated customary international 
law requiring prompt, adequate, and effective compensation.79 In the Court’s 
view, the doctrine rested on both comity and constitutional underpinnings of 
 
 73. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319 (1936). 
 74. Joel R. Paul, The Geopolitical Constitution: Executive Expediency and Executive Agreements, 
86 CAL. L. REV. 671, 689–92 (1998). 
 75. Geopolitical threats justified the president unilaterally deploying military forces and covert 
operatives, suppressing information from Congress and the public, imposing background checks, 
loyalty pledges, and speech restrictions on government workers, and invading the privacy of other 
citizens. Id. at 675–77. 
 76. Banco Nacionale de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 415 (1964). 
 77. Id. at 420. 
 78. Id. at 430–31. 
 79. Id. at 436–37. 
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the separation of powers.80 Sabbatino went beyond the traditional comity 
rationale that U.S. courts must defer to a foreign sovereign. Here, the Court 
stated explicitly that its judgment rested at least in part on the need to defer to 
the executive in order to avoid interference in the conduct of foreign relations.81 
It may seem ironic that the Court used comity in Sabbatino as a justification 
for deferring to a communist expropriation of private property, particularly in 
light of the Court’s general deference to private party autonomy. When comity 
is used as a justification—rather than as a doctrinal rule—it may operate to 
justify contradictory actions. In this case, deference to the executive trumped 
the Court’s deference to the rights of private parties. It reflected in part the 
Court’s view of the relative importance of giving the executive the widest 
latitude in dealing with communist states. 
The Supreme Court’s decision in First National City Bank v. Banco Nacional 
de Cuba clarified this new form of comity.82 Writing for a plurality of the Court, 
then-Justice Rehnquist opined that the Court should not apply the foreign-act-
of-state doctrine where the executive has advised the Court against it.83 
Rehnquist affirmed that both the act-of-state and sovereign-immunity doctrines 
are judicially created to effectuate general notions of comity among nations and 
among the respective branches of the Federal Government.84 With that single 
sentence, the Supreme Court acknowledged an equivalence in the way that 
courts defer to foreign law and defer to the executive in the conduct of foreign 
relations. In both instances there is a risk that judicial intervention could 
“embarrass the conduct of foreign relations by the political branches.”85 
The risk of embarrassing the executive is a curious rationale for a conflicts 
principle in several respects. First, the court implicitly leaves the legislative 
branch out of the formulation. The courts might, for example, look to the 
lawmakers for instruction as to when to apply foreign law so as not to 
complicate foreign relations or defeat the legislative intent. By pointing to the 
executive, the courts shift the constitutional authority over lawmaking from the 
legislature to the executive or from the domestic sphere to the arena of foreign 
relations. Even if one believes that the executive has the primary responsibility 
for the conduct of foreign relations—a position not necessarily consistent with 
the Constitution’s own text86—a strong argument could be made that conflicts 
 
 80. Id. at 417–18, 423. 
 81. Id. at 447. 
 82. First Nat’l City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759 (1972). 
 83. Id. at 768. 
 84. Id. at 762. 
 85. Id. at 765. 
 86. Article I of the Constitution clearly enumerates a vast range of congressional power over 
foreign relations, while Article II gives the president the relatively modest authority to receive foreign 
ambassadors ceremonially and appoint ambassadors and negotiate treaties with the Senate’s advice and 
consent. Article II also gives the president military authority as commander-in-chief, which seems 
logically distinct from the power to conduct foreign relations, and which authority is subordinate to 
Congress’ power to authorize, raise, regulate, and finance the military. See Paul, supra note 74, at 691–
92. 
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principles are more closely related to the prescriptive powers of the lawmakers 
than to the foreign-relations powers of the executive. 
Second, this judicial deference to the executive seems to undermine the 
rationale for the traditional rule of respect for foreign sovereigns. Traditionally, 
comity was designed to facilitate good relations with foreign sovereigns by 
according them fair and equal treatment in the courts.87 By contrast, the 
transformation of comity into a rule of deference to the executive has the 
perverse effect of politicizing the judicial process. The executive branch can 
determine the outcome in a U.S. court just by advising the court whether to 
allow the foreign act of state defense. By relegating the court to the role of a 
mere intermediary for the executive, comity undermines the principle of the 
rule of law itself. If the court allows the executive to decide when and how to 
proceed, then all foreign sovereigns and their laws may not be equal in 
American courts. One could argue that any principle of conflicts that allows 
either the courts or the executive unbridled discretion to determine the 
applicable law in each individual case creates uncertainties that weaken the 
rule-of-law principle. However, as between affording discretion to the executive 
or to judges, it seems that courts acting alone would be less likely than the 
executive to be influenced by inappropriate political considerations in the 
determination of the applicable law. For example, if the executive can control 
access to the court, there is a risk that the executive would be more likely to 
assert authority on behalf of a political ally or powerful constituency than on 
another equally deserving party. Such actions would tend to undermine the 
legitimacy of the judicial branch. 
Third, the rhetoric of deference to the executive undermined the principle 
of democratic accountability by privileging the executive’s role in foreign 
relations over Congress’ constitutional prerogatives. Of course, many scholars 
would defend the growth of the executive’s power in the face of the Soviet 
threat.88 Comity as deference to the executive reinforced a more general trend 
of concentrating power in the presidency. The courts seemed to forget that the 
Constitution expressly gives Congress the power to control foreign commerce, 
impose tariffs, adopt treaties, raise and regulate the military, appropriate funds, 
approve ambassadors, prescribe offenses against the law of nations, and declare 
war.89 The disastrous consequences of the executive acting unilaterally to project 
U.S. power around the globe were as apparent during the Cold War as they are 
today. Deploying comity as a form of unquestioning deference to the executive 
branch would not create a stable doctrinal foundation for conflicts of law. It 
 
 87. See supra II.B. 
 88. See, e.g., William F. Mullen, PRESIDENTIAL POWER AND POLITICS 39–40 (1976) (arguing that 
the geopolitical conditions of the Cold War era necessitated giving greater authority to the executive); 
James A. Nathan & James K. Oliver, FOREIGN POLICY MAKING AND THE AMERICAN POLITICAL 
SYSTEM 10–25 (3d ed. 1994) (explaining the growth of presidential power as a consequence of the 
competition with the Soviet Union); Eugene Rostow, Great Cases Make Bad Law: The War Powers 
Resolution, 50 TEX. L. REV. 833 (1972). 
 89. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8; art. II, § 2. 
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could survive the Cold War because of the felt necessity to yield to the hand of 
a central authority. So long as foreign relations seemed a dark and mysterious 
wood filled with danger and duplicity, the application of foreign law would be 
seen as an acknowledgement of respect for the executive as father figure. As 
the world emerged from the Cold War to the new realities of globalization, the 
justification for deference had to change. 
Finally, relying on the risk of embarrassment as a rationale for a conflicts 
principle operates as a kind of backhanded compliment to the executive. The 
image of an embarrassed executive is itself revealing as a form of justificatory 
rhetoric. On the one hand, the Court appears to be modestly deferring to the 
executive based on institutional competence. In the words of Justice Douglas, 
by deferring to the executive’s opinion, a so-called Bernstein letter, “the Court 
becomes a mere errand boy for the Executive Branch which may choose to pick 
some people’s chestnuts from the fire, but not others.”90 On the other hand, the 
image of an embarrassed executive is hardly a commanding one. An executive 
who can be embarrassed is also an executive who is exposed, naked—in other 
words, an emperor with no clothes. It is not only a question of the executive’s 
competence, but of the executive’s power. The executive’s vulnerability is so 
demonstrable that the court risks emasculating the executive merely by deciding 
to award a claim for damages. By acknowledging the risk of interference with 
the conduct of foreign relations, the Court calls into question the executive’s 
power to act and suggests that, like the Wizard of Oz, the president may be a 
mere humbug behind a curtain. 
C. Comity and the Public–Private Divide in International Law 
So we have two concurrent developments in the concept of comity from the 
mid- to late twentieth century. In some cases, the courts justified the imposition 
of foreign law based upon the idea of protecting the expectations and autonomy 
of private parties. In other cases the courts justified the application of foreign 
law by arguing that they were not institutionally competent to adjudicate 
questions that implicated foreign relations, and therefore, they would defer to 
the executive as the “sole organ of foreign relations.” 
Liberal free-trade policy and the Cold War led to a bold new rhetoric of 
comity that obligated courts to apply foreign law, even when the consequences 
were inconsistent with basic public policy or international law. Paradoxically, 
comity functioned both to unify and to separate public and private law. Comity 
bridged the public and private realms by introducing public-policy 
considerations into the discussion of private-law disputes. Yet, at the same time, 
courts were also obligated to consider the expectations of private parties. In this 
way, comity functioned also as a wall to protect private parties in the 
marketplace from government interference.91 
 
 90. First National City Bank, 406 U.S. at 770–73. 
 91. Paul, supra note 11, at 77–79. 
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IV 
GLOBALIZATION: COMITY AS DEFERENCE TO THE MARKET 
With the end of the Cold War, the Supreme Court seemed to back away 
from the idea of comity as preserving executive supremacy in foreign relations. 
In the 1993 case of Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v. California, the Court signaled 
that it was taking a different view of the doctrine of international comity.92 In 
that case, the defendant U.S. and British companies allegedly violated Section 1 
of the Sherman Antitrust Act by conspiring to limit the available coverage for 
commercial general-liability insurance in the United States.93 There is no 
question that the Sherman Act can apply to some foreign conduct. Congress in 
1982 had adopted the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act (FTAIA), 
which provided that the Sherman Act applied to foreign trade or commerce 
that has a “direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect” on domestic 
commerce.94 However, the FTAIA did not expressly state that extraterritorial 
jurisdiction should not be limited by international comity. Therefore, the British 
reinsurance companies argued in part that, according to international comity, 
the Sherman Act should not apply to foreign conduct that was otherwise legal 
in Britain.95 
Justice Souter’s opinion for the Court stated that international comity 
considerations would arise only if there were a “true conflict between domestic 
and foreign law.”96 According to Souter, only when foreign law required a party 
to do something contrary to U.S. law would there be a “true conflict.” Thus, in 
this case, since the British companies did not claim that British law actually 
required them to limit the terms of reinsurance coverage, there was no “true 
conflict,” and the Court had no reason to apply a comity analysis to limit the 
scope of U.S. antitrust jurisdiction. In effect, according to the Court’s opinion, 
the foreign-sovereign-compulsion defense literally swallowed up the doctrine of 
comity. Many commentators read the Hartford Fire Insurance opinion as 
questioning the doctrine of comity and the principle of reasonableness.97 
In his dissenting opinion in Hartford Fire Insurance, Justice Scalia conceded 
that “it is now well established that the Sherman Act applies 
extraterritorially.”98 However, Scalia asserted that according to the Charming 
Betsy canon of statutory construction, an act of Congress should never be 
construed as violating international law if any other possible interpretation is 
available.99 To ensure that international law is not violated, Scalia argued that 
 
 92. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764 (1993). 
 93. Id. at 770. 
 94. Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97–290 (codified at 96 Stat. 
1246) (1982). 
 95. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 509 U.S. at 769. 
 96. Id. at 765. 
 97. See, e.g., Lowenfeld, supra note 69, at 47–51. 
 98. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 509 U.S. at 814 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 99. Id. at 814–15 (citing Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804)). 
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extraterritorial jurisdiction must be tempered by considerations of international 
comity.100 In other words, Justice Scalia treated comity as a binding rule of 
international law, and he equated the comity analysis with the requirement in 
the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States that the 
exercise of prescriptive jurisdiction must be “reasonable.”101 According to the 
Restatement, courts are obligated to consider the connections and degree of 
interests of all the affected states.102 Given that the relevant activities occurred in 
the United Kingdom, the defendants were British, and Britain has a 
comprehensive set of regulations for the reinsurance industry, he concluded 
that the United States clearly did not have a sufficient connection or interest in 
the transaction to warrant the exercise of legislative jurisdiction.103 
Justice Scalia’s dissent carried the day in the Supreme Court’s 2004 decision 
in F. Hoffman-La Roche, Ltd. v. Empagran, S.A.104 Foreign plaintiffs brought a 
class action suit under the Sherman Antitrust Act against foreign defendants 
who had conspicuously conspired to fix prices in the worldwide market for bulk 
vitamins.105 Relying in part on the Charming Besty canon, the Court opined that 
the statute had to be read consistently with the principle of comity to avoid 
offending foreign sovereigns.106 Accordingly, it held that the plaintiffs had no 
cause of action when the admittedly significant effect on U.S. commerce was 
independent of the effect on foreign commerce.107 Writing for the majority, 
Justice Kennedy asserted that this 
rule of statutory construction cautions courts to assume that legislators take account of 
the legitimate sovereign interests of other nations when they write American laws. It 
thereby helps the potentially conflicting laws of different nations work together in 
harmony—a harmony particularly needed in today’s highly interdependent 
commercial world.108 
The Court read Congress’s intention in light of the interests of the 
interdependent world market. Whereas Charming Betsy required courts to 
assume that Congress intended to legislate consistent with international law, the 
principle of international comity, at least as understood in the United States, 
was never a rule of international law. Comity as applied in U.S. courts was a 
uniquely American common-law doctrine reflecting our concerns about 
separation of powers and our particular historical experience. Foreign courts in 
both common-law and civil-law jurisdictions have not recognized comity as 
 
 100. Id. at 817. 
 101. Id. at 818–19 (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED 
STATES § 403(1) (1986)). 
 102. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 403(1) 
(1986). 
 103. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 509 U.S. at 820–22 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 104. 542 U.S. 155 (2004). 
 105. Id. at 159–60. 
 106. Id. at 164. 
 107. Id. at 175. 
 108. Id. at 164–65. 
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private international law.109 Indeed, most foreign courts would agree with 
Cheshire and North that deciding when to apply foreign law according to the 
doctrine of comity “is incompatible with the judicial function, for comity is a 
matter for sovereigns, not for judges.”110 
Key to the Court’s justificatory rhetoric is the image of the “highly 
interdependent” global market.111 Similarly, the Court in Mitsubishi Motors 
Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc. enforced a choice-of-law provision out of 
“sensitivity to the need of the international commercial system for 
predictability.”112 Again, in The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co. the Court 
cautioned that “[w]e cannot have trade and commerce in world markets and 
international waters exclusively on our terms, governed by our laws, and 
resolved in our courts.”113 And in Scherck v. Alberto-Culver Co. the Court 
stressed the damage that “a parochial refusal by the courts” to enforce a foreign 
arbitration agreement would do to “the fabric of international commerce and 
trade.”114 In each of these cases the Court sacrificed an important U.S. public 
policy embodied in U.S. statutes to the requirements of the global market. 
Similarly, in the Empagran decision, the Court failed to reinforce U.S. 
prohibitions against price fixing (by affording a remedy to the foreign plaintiffs) 
in deference to the global market.115 
Those who appeal to a globalized market as a justification for limiting 
domestic jurisdiction assert that the United States depends on foreign 
commerce in a way that limits our autonomy. The Empagran decision assumes 
that we are no longer masters of our economic destiny; we are merely 
competitors in a global marketplace, and as such market forces require us to 
adjust our legal environment to encourage cross-border investment and 
commerce. Comity demands not merely respect for foreign sovereigns, the 
executive, or even for the autonomy of private parties; comity demands respect 
for the market itself. The Empagran judgment seems to treat the market as if it 
possesses its own autonomous will, much as courts once referred to the 
sovereign’s will. In this globalized economy, courts serve a higher master and 
the sovereign’s will must yield to the will of the market. 
 
 109. Paul, supra note 11, at 27–44. 
 110. PETER NORTH & J.J. FAWCETT, CHESHIRE AND NORTH’S PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 5 
(13th ed. 1999) (“The fact is, of course, that the application of a foreign law implies no act of courtesy, 
no sacrifice of sovereignty. It merely derives from a desire to do justice.”). 
 111. Hoffman-La Roche, 542 U.S. at 165 (2004). 
 112. Mitisubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler, 473 U.S. 614, 629 (1985). 
 113. The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 9 (1971). 
 114. Scherck v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 517 (1974). 
 115. Hoffman-La Roche, 542 U.S. at 173 (2004). 
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V 
CONCLUSION 
Over four centuries, the doctrine of international comity has proved to be 
remarkably elastic and adaptive. What began in nineteenth-century U.S. 
jurisprudence as an assertion of the primacy of the forum’s own law morphed 
into an obligation to apply foreign law. In the shadow of the Cold War, comity 
broadened to become a general principle of deference and a justification for 
limiting domestic jurisdiction to prescribe, adjudicate, or enforce. Deference to 
foreign sovereigns became deference to the executive or to the power of 
contracting parties to select their own law and forum. As the threat of the Cold 
War receded, comity once again is adapting to the new realities of globalization. 
The Court’s decision in Empagran suggests that comity may have found a new 
object of deference: the Market. 
If Empagran signals the next incarnation of comity, it is a dangerous and 
ironic formulation. Deference to the Market has nothing to do with respect for 
foreign law or private parties. Treating the Market as if it were an autonomous 
being with a will of its own is delusional.116 When courts sacrifice the forum’s 
public policy to suit the market, they are substituting their own ideological 
preference for markets for the policy choices that legislators have exercised. In 
so doing courts are frustrating policies that are the product of a democratic 
process. 
The mere possibility that the application of domestic jurisdiction may be 
burdensome or even hostile to international commerce hardly seems a basis for 
courts to refuse to exercise jurisdiction. Comity was conceived originally as 
mutual respect between sovereigns. The rule of Empagran disrespects 
sovereigns. It suggests that courts may arrogate to themselves the power that 
comity acknowledged rests exclusively in the hands of the sovereign. Courts, 
out of respect for the separation of powers, as well as respect for foreign 
sovereigns, should apply jurisdiction as the lawmakers intended it to be applied 
and leave the interest-balancing to the political process. 
 
 116. Joel R. Paul, Free Trade, Regulatory Competition and the Autonomous Market Fallacy, 1 
COLUM. J. EUR. L. 29, 33–41 (1995). 
